He wrote many of the most important essays that became known as The Federalist. In Virginia's ratifying convention, his knowledge and reasoning overcame the firebrand objections of Patrick Henry to secure approval of the Constitution.
In the new government Madison was elected to the House of Representatives, where he became its most influential member, drafting the Bill of Rights and supporting legislation that gave strength to the new federal government. He was a close friend and advisor of George Washington in the first years of his presidency.
With Thomas Jefferson, Madison formed the nation's first political party in the s in opposition to the policies of Alexander Hamilton. Madison served as secretary of state during Jefferson's presidency and was elected president in He led the new nation through its first major war the War of His wife Dolley was so successful in establishing the hospitality of the presidency that she inspired the term "First Lady. He died there in What role did Madison play at the Philadelphia Convention?
In later years Madison denied that he was the "Father of the Constitution," observing that the nation's charter was "the work of many heads and many hands" rather than the "the offspring of a single brain. Madison showed this blend of abilities in his preparation for the Convention. He researched texts examining every form of government that was known.
He summarized his conclusions in two papers, one on "Ancient and Modern Confederations," the other on "Vices of the Political System of the United States. Madison designed an alternative constitutional framework that would avoid these problems.
Introduced at the Convention by Virginia's delegates, it became known as the Virginia Plan. Madison's Virginia Plan determined in large measure the direction the Philadelphia Convention would take. It ensured that the work of the delegates would focus not on whether the Articles of Confederation should be replaced, but rather on the composition of the new government to replace it.
Madison's views, however, did not always prevail at the Convention. Of the seventy-one suggestions he proposed or supported, forty were voted down. He was disappointed that the Convention delegates rejected proportional representation for the Senate in favor of equal representation of the states the Great Compromise.
He considered this a breach of republican principles of representative government. He also opposed giving the selection of senators to state legislatures. The Virginia Plan's call for Congress to have a veto power over some state legislation was also rejected in favor of the more general Supremacy Clause. This compromise, however, would later provide the basis for judicial review and for accomplishing much the same purpose Madison had in mind.
The delegates' work on the executive branch, to which Madison had given little thought beforehand, sharpened his appreciation of the Constitution's use of checks and balances, a benefit he would emphasize in his Federalist essays.
Madison was probably the most active Convention delegate. His role in the debates, in which he spoke over times, and as the Convention's unofficial secretary, taking detailed notes of the proceedings in his own special shorthand, required Madison's almost constant attendance that summer.
The effort, he later confessed, "almost killed him. Why did Madison take a front seat at the Convention? What were the major themes of Madison's Federalist essays? Along with his co-authors, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, Madison wrote as a partisan defender of the Constitution against the attacks of the Anti-Federalists. Madison wrote twenty-four of his twenty-nine Federalist essays in seven weeks, at the remarkable pace of three essays a week. Many of these essays rank among the best political thought ever produced.
His Federalist writings allowed Madison to expand upon his vision of republican government and on his belief that the proposed Constitution would accommodate both the ideals and the political realities of the young republic. In Federalist 10 , which many scholars consider to be Madison's masterpiece, he redefined the traditional concepts of democracy and a republic. He demonstrated that by "extending the sphere" of republican government to a national scope, the nation could avoid many of the problems of such a form of government at the local level.
The greater diversity of large republics minimized the evils of faction and popular passion, making it more difficult for tyrannical majorities to combine. The representative government provided by the Constitution for such a republic, he argued, would also shield those in government from local passions.
Larger constituencies and the indirect procedures for selecting a president, senators, and federal judges would encourage the choice of the most qualified. Madison described such provisions in the Constitution as a "republican remedy" for the "diseases most incident to republican government. In Federalist 51 Madison offered what is perhaps the best explanation of a system of government based on separation of powers that has ever been written.
Acknowledging that if "men were angels" no government would be needed, Madison argued that any government "administered by men over men" must be so constituted so as to control itself as well as the governed. The electoral process provided a primary means of controlling government, but "auxiliary precautions" were also needed.
The Constitution would provide these precautions by so constituting the national government in its separate branches as to discourage the abuse of power. A system of checks and balances, Madison believed, would give "to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. Similarly, Congress and the Supreme Court would combine personal motives and constitutional powers to resist any intrusion by the other branches.
Madison, Hamilton, and Jay wrote The Federalist as part of a campaign for ratification of the Constitution. Their writings have since become a classic text for representative democracy, translated and read by many people around the world. What contribution did Madison make to establishing the principles of religious freedom? From his first year in the Virginia legislature in , Madison was an advocate of religious freedom.
In colonial Virginia, the Anglican Episcopal church was established by law as the official religion and received public funding. Madison became convinced such favoritism was wrong, because it discriminated against Baptists and other religions in Virginia.
Madison believed that allowing a diversity of faiths to exist together on an equal footing was the best assurance against religious persecution and strife. Though he helped persuade George Mason to endorse the "liberty of conscience for all" in the Virginia Declaration of Rights , he was not able to separate church and government in Virginia's new constitution.
Madison, however, did not give up. Ten years later in the Virginia legislature he led the effort to adopt the Statute for Religious Freedom drafted by Thomas Jefferson. The law provided the basis for ending a state church in Virginia and granting equal freedom to all faiths. In Madison's words it "extinguished forever the ambitious hope of making laws for the human mind. Madison's strong belief in religious freedom is also evident in his drafting of the U. Bill of Rights.
He had originally opposed adding a bill of rights to the Constitution because he doubted the effectiveness of mere "paper barriers" to tyranny and because he did not see a need for such formal guarantees in a government limited to enumerated powers. He had promised his Baptist friends and others, however, that he would work for the addition of a bill of rights if the Constitution were adopted. He also became convinced that a formal declaration of rights would widen support for the new Constitution and would help the nation's courts protect the rights of minorities against majority encroachments.
Almost single-handedly, Madison worked through the summer of to draft and secure agreement on the measure. Overcoming the apathy and skepticism of congressional colleagues and working out an acceptable draft from among many proposals required all of Madison's political skills.
Though many among the Framers could claim to have had a hand in "fathering" the Constitution, the Bill of Rights was primarily Madison's offspring. In his Federalist essays and earlier writings Madison reflected the negative view of party and faction that was common to eighteenth-century thought. In Federalist 10 he defined a faction as a "number of citizens Madison changed such views when he himself became a partisan in the s.
Believing that Hamilton's financial, economic and diplomatic plans for the young republic were both bad policy and contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution, he organized an opposition in Congress that was called "Mr. These letters were the basis of those resolutions submitted by Governor Randolph to the convention on 29 May which became known in history as the Virginia Plan. Indeed, many of the ideas and supporting facts that JM put forward in his speeches at Philadelphia, his numbers of The Federalist , and his speeches at the Virginia ratifying convention were but an extension and refinement of the research and insights embodied in the memorandums and letters he wrote before the Philadelphia meeting.
Although according to the docket on the Ms JM wrote Vices of the Political System in April, he probably worked on it intermittently from the time he returned to Congress in February. He apparently left his observations unfinished, for there is a blank space opposite the last vice in his list. The earlier work is a heavily annotated series of fragmentary and incomplete notes based on a distillation of ancient and modern history. The analysis of the American federal system has more the quality of a polished essay, in which JM blended together personal experience and theory in masterful fashion.
Among the vices of the American political system, JM included the impotence of the Confederation government: its inability to collect requisitions and to prevent the states from encroaching on its authority, violating treaties, and violating the rights of each other; its lack of control over commerce; and in general its lack of coercive power. Yet the dominant theme of Vices of the Political System was not the structural defects of the Articles of Confederation; the emphasis was rather on the deficiencies and derelictions of the state governments.
Boyd et al. Yet this oppression, he added, was more likely to occur in a small political unit, such as a town or a state. On the other hand, the rigors of majority rule could be mitigated by extending the sphere of government to include a multitude of factions and interests that would constantly check each other.
Logically, then, a republican government which would effectively protect minority rights could operate only over a large territory. The problem of reform was thus reduced to a single question: how could the American system of government be transformed into one extended republic?
The present system did not qualify, for it was merely a league of thirteen independent republics, in which the vicious effects of majority factionalism could not be effectively controlled. In the system he proposed, sovereignty would be securely lodged in the general government, which would operate over individuals instead of through the intermediary states. The general government would have additional positive powers, including the regulation of trade and the power to tax both imports and exports.
A government of expanded powers would have to be divided into separate departments: a national executive and judiciary, as well as a national legislature.
This federal veto was to be the foundation of the new system, the means by which thirteen independent states would become one indivisible sovereignty.
From his perspective in this problem far outweighed the problem of controlling the central government.
Yet JM consistently maintained that the purpose of the negative was not simply to reverse the trend toward anarchy. Convinced that a federal power to disallow state laws would serve the end of liberty and justice, JM was a persistent but unsuccessful advocate of such a control at the Federal Convention.
Several underlinings and braces in the Ms added at a later time by one or more unknown persons have not been noted here. Daniel Carroll attended the Federal Convention as a delegate from Maryland and may have made his copy at that time. IV, Sec. See William M. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U. Constitution Ithaca, , pp.
Rives and Philip R. Fendall, eds. Hunt Madison, Writings , II, put the interlineations in brackets. JM would expand his theory of the extended republic in his letter to Jefferson of 24 Oct. Indeed, one of his earliest philosophical reflections on the baneful effects of strict majority rule arose precisely over this issue see JM to Monroe, 5 Oct.
Skip navigation. Go to main content. James Madison Papers. Observations by J. This evil has been so fully experienced both during the war and since the peace, results so naturally from the number and independent authority of the States and has been so uniformly examplified in every similar Confederacy, that it may be considered as not less radically and permanently inherent in, than it is fatal to the object of, the present System. Examples of this are numerous and repetitions may be foreseen in almost every case where any favorite object of a State shall present a temptation.
Among these examples are the wars and Treaties of Georgia with the Indians—The unlicensed compacts between Virginia and Maryland, and between Pena. Jersey—the troops raised and to be kept up by Massts. From the number of Legislatures, the sphere of life from which most of their members are taken, and the circumstances under which their legislative business is carried on, irregularities of this kind must frequently happen.
Accordingly not a year has passed without instances of them in some one or other of the States. The Treaty of peace—the treaty with France—the treaty with Holland have each been violated. As yet foreign powers have not been rigorous in animadverting on us.
This moderation however cannot be mistaken for a permanent partiality to our faults, or a permanent security agst. If that was the case then how could any security possibly exist or what would be the likelihood that the laws would actually be carried out? Madison applied this same reasoning to the federal government and state governments. He demonstrated that within state governments a healthy system could not exist when laws were made but were just recommendations and did not have to be followed.
Just as this could not work with state governments mandating laws to counties with the expectation that they might be ignored, it would also not be possible for a system to work in which the federal government mandating laws to state governments but had no expectation that they would be carried out.
In others however it has received no other sanction than that of the legislative authority. Some states had accepted the Articles on Confederation in the capacity of a constitution but other states had just accepted the Articles of Confederation in the legislative aspect. In other words, the Articles of Confederation could make federal law but could not rule by that law as a constitution of the federal government.
This concept is a little simpler. There were so many laws in all the states that rights were not guaranteed in all states. Madison exposited what he meant by this further. He said that the general problems of the nation caused by all the states as a collective were just part of the complete picture and the thing that formed the other part were those things within the states.
This did not just mean that states developed laws for their own purposes but rather laws totally different from the principles of the whole nation. As far as laws exceed this limit they are a nuisance; a nuisance of the most pestilent kind. Madison acknowledged the fact that laws within states could be made more specific to meet individual needs but that so many of them would be the price of liberty. General rule of law through a national constitution would actually mean less need for every type of law within states.
When laws went beyond the purpose of ensuring rights were protected and justice was upheld they were a nuisance. Not only were there many laws within the states but the laws often changed. These laws often changed on whims and were not fully tried out. The fact that laws could be suddenly changed revealed the issue that laws were not discovering truth and justice but rather making a series of pragmatic judicial guesses based on preferences.
We daily see laws repealed of superseded, before any trial can have been made of their merits, and even before a knowledge of them can have reached the remoter districts within which they were to operate. In the regulations of trade this instability becomes a snare not only to our citizens, but to foreigners also. He said that what caused these changing laws was the bad intentions of legislators—those who made the laws. Laws were removed or replaced before they were even given a chance to be tried.
This affected the area of commerce which became a trap of states and even of foreign nations. Not only were there many laws and there were not just many frequently-changing laws, but these laws were also commonly unjust.
This would be prevented, Madison argued, by the federal Constitution. Madison said that if many laws and changing laws showed that the system lacked wisdom then what really highlighted the lack of wisdom in the system were the unjust laws of the states. This compromised the whole fundamental principle of republican government because it made the minority rule over the will of the majority. Madison believed that the majority will was the safest guard of the public interest and private rights.
These state laws were unjust because they were against both. Madison believed that the two main causes of these unjust laws came from the representative bodies and from the people themselves. He said that there were three reasons representatives sought their positions—and this can probably be extended to all those who seek political office; for ambition, for personal interest or for the public good.
Madison commented,. He said that most people entered into law-making because of ambition or personal interest more than they did for the public good. For Madison this was unfortunate. Madison saw another issue that often arose from those who were seeking the public good but were deceived.
Madison feared that honest men who were not very bright would be deceived by a popular leader, pursuing selfish goals that he would claim to be for the public good. A worse issue that Madison observed within these states that he believed was more deadly was from the people themselves instead of just the representatives. The issue with the people is that they represented many different interests.
No society could escape being divided into factions because of their jobs, their money, their religions, their political values, where they lived, etc. This could lead one section of a society to choose unjust laws that would benefit them but be bad for the rest of the people outside that particular interest group.
Whenever therefore an apparent interest or common passion unites a majority what is to restrain them from unjust violations of the rights and interest of the minority or of individuals?
This is the potential death of republican government—committed to rights and preservation of liberty—that the majority rules and decides what the law will be.
This may appear strange at first but the fact that a majority can make law and change law—even though it is key to democratic government—means that the majority can deny the rights of a minority, those who happen to be out of the majority. A majority might arise through the formation of a particular interest group and make laws for everyone in the society that are only good for them and take away the freedom of others.
This system—if not kept in balance—will ultimately be self-destructive. This will be the subject taken up by Madison in his famous Federalist This principle seems to be one that is forgotten in modern politics and is as relevant in our time as it was in the time of Madison. His point was that people should pursue their own interests in a judicious and reasonable way rather than in a way that leads to suppression. As a limited monarchy tempers the evils of an absolute one; so an extensive Republic meliorates the administration of a small Republic.
A large republic was needed in order for the system not to fail. In a large republic there are so many different interests among so many different people that it is impossible for a faction or interest group to gain a majority that could oppress the rights of others. The whole society would not be sacrificed because of the interests of a temporary majority that arose because of an interest.
In a small republic a group can gain a majority much more easily because less people have to be convinced and the people are also more likely to have similar interests but when the republic is expanded then interests can have influence without gaining total control. A monarchy that was limited could work and in the same way a republican form of government that was large would prevent the issues of a small republic. You are commenting using your WordPress. You are commenting using your Google account.
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Email Address:. Click here! Who will be the Presidential candidates in ? Can the Republicans Win the Electoral College in ? Electoral Map Video For Republicans in could a loss be better? For Republicans in could a loss be better? What Hillary Clinton and George H. Factions "By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
March 11, By Joshua Mawhorter. Commentary on Vices of the Political System of the United States Before the Constitutional Convention in James Madison busied himself with the almost constant study of history and government. PDF ] The first concern presented by Madison is that states were not obeying requirements laid out in the law.
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